Debt Dynamics in China—Serious problems but an imminent crisis is unlikely
Comments Off on Debt Dynamics in China—Serious problems but an imminent crisis is unlikelyBy Yuefen Li
Recently, there have been many articles in the international media predicting that China is facing an imminent financial/debt crisis worse than the 2008 US subprime crash. However, a closer look at the debt dynamics in China highlights some fundamental differences between the debt situation of the source country of the 2008 global financial crisis and that of China. Facts point to worrisome debt trends and problems, in particular with the corporate sector and the fast credit expansion, but would not support the current gloom and doom predictions.
Debt denominated in foreign currencies is around 12% of the GDP in 2015 according to the World Bank data, dwarfed by China’s foreign exchange reserve as well as assets held abroad. This ratio is much lower in comparison with many developing countries including some Asian countries growing at a faster rate than China. In addition, China also runs a relatively big current account surplus. Therefore, currency mismatch in debt position is not a problem for China.
Public debt is around 40 percent of GDP, a manageable rate and lower than that of many advanced economies. The Achilles heel is corporate debt which is very high at about 145% of GDP. The most dangerous trend is the speed of the debt accumulation which carries systemic risks if not addressed very quickly.
However, the mitigating factors are, firstly , China’s debt is predominantly domestic, especially after the fast deleverage of corporate foreign debt in 2015 and secondly, China’s gross savings are close to 50% of GDP. On the other hand, household debt is relatively low and savings are high, which is an important cushioning factor. The analysis from the IMF economists also confirms that there is a healthy risk-sharing across households and corporations. Countries that save more can afford to borrow more. Besides, certain features of the Chinese economy allow corrective measures to be taken more quickly than some other economies. For instance, capital control measures and state ownership of some systemically important banks can provide the government with more policy space in times of need. A comforting fact is that the high leverage issue is not a problem that the government is not aware of. As the Associate Managing Director of Moody’s Investors Service stated recently at an interview at CNBC “Not only do the (Chinese) authorities know what the situation is, but they have the tools and the intention, the willingness to address the issue (of) high leverages.
I. Size and composition of China’s debt problem
According to IMF data, the total debt of China, which includes all categories of liabilities, was at 225 percent of GDP. Comparatively speaking, this ratio is lower than some developed countries but higher than almost all the developing countries except two.
China’s debt is predominantly domestic and external debt is low: Moody’s estimated China’s domestic debt at 196.8 percent of GDP in 2014 and external debt at 7 percent in 2015. External debt is much lower than many emerging and developing economies. Thus, China does not have difficulties in servicing its external debt at all. The IMF’s latest regional report stated that foreign bank claims on China account for $1 trillion. Foreign direct investment and portfolio equity together account for 70 percent of China’s external liabilities, a much safer structure of liabilities than debt denominated in foreign currencies. Its net international investment position is about 1.6 trillion or 15% of GDP.
Central government debt is not high but local government debt is huge: China’s public debt has risen markedly, to 40.6% of GDP at the end of 2015, according to Moody’s estimates, from 32.5% in 2012. The central government debt was at 17 percent of GDP in 2015. This ratio is still below the public debt to GDP ratios of major advanced economies.
Household debt is low and savings are high: Households now have debt equal to 38% of GDP. Much of the debt is concentrated in house mortgages which are considered as high quality collaterals. The probability of defaulting on mortgages is low.
Corporate debt is high: The most vulnerable part of the composition of the Chinese debt is its corporate debt which stands at 145% of GDP. A large part of it is owed by state owned enterprises (SOEs).
Though the size of the corporate debt is alarming, it should not be understood as the government being exposed to contingent liabilities as big as 145% of GDP. This is because most of the SOEs are financially healthy and pose no risk of needing direct or indirect government support. According to Moody’s, about 20-25% of GDP of debt owed by SOEs may require to be restructured. The IMF warned that the corporate debt could result in bank losses equal to 7 percent of GDP, not as large as the debt restructuring-resulted bank loss as implied by Moody’s though still significant.
On the other hand, much of the corporate debt is either bank loans or domestic onshore bonds rather than offshore bonds. Seeing that the cost for floating corporate bonds are much cheaper than bank loans, Chinese corporates have rushed to the domestic bond market in recent years, pushing the ranking of the Chinese bond market to the world’s third largest with the current size of around US$ 7.7 trillion, just behind the United States and Japan. According to the Chinese central bank, the interest rate for bank loans in the first quarter of 2016 was 5.7 percent across all maturities while the yield on 10-year AAA-rated corporate bonds averaged only 3.8 percent in line with data from main bond clearing houses. Such a huge cost differential in borrowing may have resulted in arbitrage and distortion in the financial market. Corporate debt also highlights the need for economic structural reform especially for the sectors with overcapacity. For instance, labor intensive textile enterprises tend to have higher debt and non-performing loans (NPL). Basically, the old economy firms (mining, manufacturing, construction, real estate, public administration, etc.) borrowed the most, accounting for 64% of total loans in recent years.
II. Systemic financial and economic risks posed by the debt burden
Though the size and composition of China’s debt does not support the prediction of an imminent debt crisis in view of its asset position, they do expose some underlining systemic financial and economic risks.
Breathtaking speed of debt increase and diminishing returns: Economists have often used such adjectives as “neck breaking” and “breathtaking” to describe the fast economic growth of China in the 1980s and 1990s. Right now the same two words could be borrowed to describe the increase of the Chinese debt burden. The past 7 years have witnessed a tremendously dangerous debt built up. Externalities like the global financial crisis and the resultant low aggregate demand is a factor. China’s deliberate self-chosen structural transition from a trade and investment driven growth model to one which relies more on domestic consumption and service industry could be another reason. However, this fast increase of debt also exposes some distortions and systemic risks. Lending by the shadow banking sector and bonds increased fast.
The alarming phenomenon is that the already fast credit increase has picked up speed in 2016. Credit growth in the first quarter of 2016 was reported to be up 58% over the same quarter in 2015 at 7.8 trillion Chinese yuan. The first round of expansionary credit policy in response to the global financial crisis in 2008 had some positive effects to counter the negative effects of the global financial crisis by expanding aggregate demand. However, now the margin efficiency of credit increase has been diminishing as an increase in each unit of credit in China is generating lesser and lesser amount of GDP. Some economists have been debating whether this is a result of wasteful investment, including lending to the so called “zombie enterprises” – enterprises which are not efficient or with overcapacity – to keep them afloat. It may also be the case that money borrowed has been kept at the balance sheet of enterprises without being invested in productive sectors. To stimulate the economy without looking into the absorbing power and efficiency could be counterproductive and create bubbles and wasteful investments.
Non-performing loans from the corporate sector and local governments pose threat to the banking sector: The IMF estimates that 15.5 percent of total commercial banks’ loans to corporates, or $1.3 trillion (12 percent of GDP) are potentially at risk of being turned into non-performing loans as the profit earnings of the enterprises do not show the ability to service their debt. In addition, it is doubtful that local governments have the capacity to service the debt mountain amounting $4 trillion in view of their limited channels for raising revenue.
Recently, the central government has allowed corporations to swap their debt with banks in exchange for equity, named debt-for-equity swap. This kind of technique was used by other countries as well as China before. In times of good economic growth, it could be quite effective as with time the size of debt would decrease to a very manageable amount. It happened to China in the late 1990s. However, at times of slower economic growth as it is now, its effectiveness could be reduced and could even worsen the burden on the banking system as banks would be forfeited the business opportunity to receive interest and principal payments and also lose the ability to sell the equity to the central bank or other banks. The IMF published a paper in April 2016 to alert that the maturity transformation and liquidity transformation through the debt-for-equity swap may just kick the can down the road and would not address the problem of NPL fundamentally. Meanwhile, it could worsen the banks’ asset quality. Similarly, local governments will be allowed to swap 1 trillion yuan ($160 billion) of their existing high-interest debts for lower-cost bonds. Such a swap should also be accompanied by policies to increase local government revenue and promote efficiency of their investment.
III. An imminent debt crisis is unlikely
Even though corporate sector and local governments are the country’s major problems in terms of debt, they still seem to be manageable for the moment if actions to redress the problems would be taken quickly.
At the central government level, the foreign reserves are still the largest in the world at more than US$ 3.2 trillion in February 2016. Even though trade surplus has been shrinking, current account surplus is still healthy. The corporate and local government debt are predominantly domestic. If needed, the central government is in a position to stimulate the economy by increasing central government debt.
The savings level in China is still high and is mainly intermediated by the banking sector. An economist from Fitch rating agency commented on this unique feature of the Chinese financial system and stated that “China’s financial system is dominated by banks and funded overwhelmingly by retail deposits. Both the banks and borrowers are either state-owned or heavily state-influenced. These factors suggest that the kind of collapse of confidence among creditors that might precipitate a financial crisis is unlikely in China.” The relatively low household debt and high savings rate is a good anchor for the financial system. It minimizes the risk of fast reduction of consumption which can have negative impact on growth, employment and investment. The IMF economists considered this as a healthy risk-sharing across households and corporates, meaning households save and the corporates borrow. Households continue to have confidence in the banking system making the Chinese banks relatively liquid and a financial crisis led by drying up of liquidity less likely.
Another mitigating factor is that much of the credit is coming from the banking system and is not highly leveraged. The banking system is liquid and mainly financed by deposits. Bank deposits amount to more than 200% of GDP. The financial system in China still lacks the sophistication of the advanced economies where securitization is much more prevalent than in China. On the whole, China has very significant amount of highly liquid assets.
China’s GDP growth rate is decent, at 6.9 percent, especially in the current world economic environment. Its growth outlook is still robust. The IMF recently revised it a bit higher while lowered GDP growth forecast for some countries.
Two factors should be also taken into consideration, namely China’s capital account has not yet been not fully liberalised, though reforms are underway. Besides, government has more direct influence over state-owned banks and SOEs.
Even in the worst scenario when corporate debt and local government debt turned into non-performing loan en mass, which does not seem likely at this moment, the Chinese central government would still have tools and resources to deal with the problem. Firstly, the government has the fiscal space as its fiscal deficit is only around 3% of GDP. During the past and current financial crisis, socialization of debt has been repeatedly used even though it has been widely criticized. In times of need, China has policy space to do the same. It should be relatively less painful for China as much of the corporate debt is owed by SOEs and some large banks are state owned. However, this should not kick SOE reform down the road. In addition, as some major banks are state owned and with good liquidity positions, the government can resort to banks to step in at a scale much larger than the current swaps if the situation warrants such kind of intervention.
IV. The way forward
Being the second largest economy in the world, China’s contribution to the economic growth in the world has been significant, accounting for 27 percent for 2015 and 26 percent in 2014. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable and natural for the world to pay attention to and even worry about the debt problem China is facing. A financial catastrophe for China would definitely have major ramifications to the world. It is important for China to face the challenges and take urgent steps to address the current problems. The following may be some of the options that deserve to be considered:
Slow down the fast credit expansion and enhance investment quality: Increasing debt and lower economic growth is a legacy of the global financial crisis. The current credit explosion in China carries the risk of a banking crisis in coming years. The corporate and local government debt are approaching critical levels. Banks and financial intermediary institutions should enhance capacity in pricing risks and improve quality of lending. An important part of the credit should be spent on productive sector to allow decent growth and debt servicing capacity. With the current debt level, credit expansion without proper design would amount to giving alcohol to a drunken person, which would only worsen the hangover. It is important to distinguish borrowing which creates wealth and return for servicing debt from borrowing which delays restructuring needs and prolongs the life span of entities which see no prospects of bringing back returns larger than the investment.
Not to deleverage would lead to the Japanese style of chronically low or no growth for decades, as high debt servicing would be a burden for economic growth and structural reform would be pushed to the future .
Undertake structural reform for SOEs and taxation reform for local governments: Restructuring the SOEs would be essential for addressing the debt burden of the corporate sector and make them robust and lean. As for local governments, a fundamental examination and reform of the taxation system may be required to allow sustainable stream of revenue to the local governments and have a clear redistribution of financial obligations and responsibilities between the central and local governments.
Maintain economic growth: The best way of solving the debt problem would be maintaining and enhancing economic growth. Yet, it is a complicated and multidisciplinary topic. It is abundantly clear that to rely solely on credit expansion without decent return would defeat the purpose.
Live with appropriate level of debt: Excess of debt in some sectors may continue to haunt for some years. Yet, it should be pointed out that as China is still a developing country at the stage of catching up, it would need to live with some debt. There is a trade off in paying down domestic and external debt. Therefore, if the fiscal position is comfortable and no debt crisis is looming, to maintain some level of debt would be healthy. Organic economic growth with no debt could forego chances of faster economic growth. With China’s high savings rate, it seems China can afford to have relatively high debt. But to determine what is the comfortable and optimal level of debt is not an easy job. It is a science rather than art.
Strengthen deposit insurance: Deposit insurance could increase confidence in the banking system and is considered as an option against bank run risk. Apparently, the Chinese population has confidence in the banking sector. Nevertheless, its pros and cons could be studied.
Continue with the current deleveraging policy measures: Current debt swaps for corporate and local government debt are not unique policy measures. China has used it before, as well as other governments. It would be important to undertake empirical studies and examine ways to make them more effective.
China’s debt dynamics is an excellent case to demonstrate that assessing debt sustainability and tracking debt vulnerabilities is a complicated task. The macroeconomic structure, savings pattern, characteristics of the banking system, economic policies, liquidity provision and a host of other factors interact with each other. For emerging and developing economies whose domestic financial markets are neither mature nor deep, it would be necessary to strengthen capacity for effective asset and liability management in national debt management.
Yuefen Li is the Special Advisor on Economics and Development Finance of the South Centre.